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Neutrality and Information Warfare

George K. WalkerI

~ ~ T h e r e is nothing new about revising neutrality; it has undergone an
almost constant process of revision in detail," Philip Jessup concluded in 1936.2 He also believed
... [N]othing could be more fallacious than the attempt to test the application of
rules of neutrality by the principles of logic. Since they are products of
compromise and of experience, logic has found practically no place in their
development and cannot properly be used in their application. 3

Over halfa century into the UN Charter era, litde would change these observations, even in the infonnation warfare (IW)4 context. New considerations
have appeared, 5 including the Charter itself; the process of analyzing the law of
neutrality defies a straightforward, positivist, black-letter approach. Principles of
neutrality for maritime warfare have been seen to be less rigid, from an historical
perspective, than those for air or land warfare, 6 for example.
Some claim neutrality is in "chronic obsolescence."7 A majorreason, according to those who say future applications of the law of neutrality will be minimal,
is an argument that the Charter has ended the rights and duties of the old law of
neutrality.8 Another argument is that since the Charter has oudawed war,9 there
can be no state of war, and therefore there is no need for a law of neutrality .10

The opinions shared in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views and opinions
of the U.S. Naval War College, the Dept. of the Navy, or Dept. of Defense.

Neutrality and Infonnation Warfare
(This position might be considered in light of the Pact ofParis [1928], outlawing
aggressive war.11 World War II began a decade later.)
Many others, reflecting State practice and claims in the Charter era, maintain that
the law of neutrality continues to exist. The San Rema Manual recognizes maritime
neutrality.12 The 1992-96 International Law Association Committee on Maritime
Neutrality studied neutrality, and the 1998 ILA conference accepted the Committee's final report. 13 Individual researchers assert that neutrality remains a valid legal
concept, albeit modified by the impact ofthe Charter and other considerations. 14
Like the reports of Mark Twain's passing, accounts of neutrality's demise in
the Charter era have been greatly exaggerated, as, the ensuing analysis of the application of neutrality principles to information warfare demonstrates.

Application of the Principles of the Law of Neutrality
to Information Warfare
The law of warfare has little, if any, direct reference to problems of armed
conflict involving IW. The Charter applies across the board to all treaties, and
perhaps customary law as well. 1S Although there are a few treaties ,vith some
bearing on transmission of information, e.g., Hague V and XIII, in most cases
the analysis must proceed from general custom, general principles, and analysis
by analogy. General principles of law occupy an anomalous position among
sources of international law. Although the Statute of the International Court of
Justice lists them among primary sources that may be cited in cases before the
Court,16 and some commentators include them among primary sources for deriving rules of law,17 others accord them secondary status, perhaps as
gap-fillers. 18 Whichever view one might take, in a new and fast-moving area of
the law where there are few guideposts, resort to general principles oflaw, and
commentators that discuss them,19 may be the only sources that are available.
What then should be the method of analysis for IW issues?
The first and primary rule should be application ofmandatory Charter norms,
e.g., the right of self-defense, with, e.g., its limitations of necessity and proportionality for reaction in self-defense,2o or UN Security Council decisions. 21 The
next level of analysis should employ the mixture of treaties, custom, etc. that
must apply in specific neutrality situations. For example, if Hague V and XIII
principles applicable to telecommunications are customary law, they should
be applied, perhaps alongside general law of armed conflict (LOAC) principles
such as necessity and proportionality in a given situation, except where there is a
prohibitory rule, e.g., no first use of poison gas, for which there can be no
proportionality or necessity qualifications. 22 In applying these principles to the
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modality of transmitting Internet messages, States will indirecdy affect use ofand
messages through the Internet. The fact that cables may be used for Internetbased messages as well as traditional telephone or telegraph messages can be necessity and proportionality factors.
Where there is no "hard law," i.e., black-letter rules governing conduct, resort must be had to general customary LOAC principles, i.e. military objective,
necessity and proportionality, which may be different from similar principles to
be observed in self-defense responses.23 The content of the law for these situations might be informed by analogies from custom, treaties and principles applied in the law ofland, sea, air and space law. As will be seen, the law of the sea
(LOS) and the law of naval warfare may offer the most and best analogies for
neutrals in IW situations.

Neutrality, Land Warfare, and Information Warfare
The implications for IW from the law of neutrality relating to neutral land
territory are several. The Charter may impact decisions on the law of neutrality,
and treaty suspension or termination principles may apply for international
agreements other than those dealing with warfare. 24 The Security Council may
make legally binding decisions under Articles 25 and 48 of the Charter, and
therefore may obligate UN Members under Articles 41-42 to take action that
might be inconsistent with traditional neutrality principles. The Council also
may make nonbinding "call[s] upon" Members under Articles 40-41. It also
may make nonbinding recommendations under Articles 39-40. IfCouncil decisions differ from traditional neutrality principles, the latter must give way.25 If
Council or General Assembly resolutions are at variance from traditional neutrality principles, and restate customary or other binding sources oflaw,26 these
resolutions also will affect the traditional law of neutrality.27
Thus, Council decisions may compel a State to behave inconsistendy with
traditional neutrality practice by requiring what would otherwise be belligerent
acts or by restricting rights neutrals traditionally enjoy.28 Nevertheless, belligerent attacks must be conditioned on general warfare principles of military objective, necessity, and proportionality.29
A neutral has a duty to prevent use of its territory for a belligerent's operations, base, or as a sanctuary.30 The activity, depending on personnel involved,
e.g., belligerent forces operating the Internet computer, may be a violation of
the neutral's territorial integrity under the Charter. 31 If a neutral knows or has
reason to know of activity within its territory involving Internet use that is
non-neutral in nature, the neutral must act to end that activity under the LOAC,
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and may invoke the Charter if the activity involves a violation of the neutral's
territorial integrity. Ifa neutral may be required to mobilize forces to ensure fulfillment ofits responsibility to prevent belligerent forces from crossing into neutral territory, and thus act in self-defense,32 by analogy it may be argued that a
neutral may mobilize or order its forces to counter an Internet attack conducted
from its territory, even if a belligerent's forces are not involved. If war materials
and supplies belonging to a belligerent, either as a matter of title or use, are employed in an Internet attack while situated within a neutral's borders, the neutral
can act against the materials and supplies. Ifbelligerent forces operate the computers, etc., the case for neutral action is stronger.
If a neutral does not or cannot effectively enforce compliance, an aggrieved
belligerent may take proportional action, either under the law ofself-defense or
the LOAC, to counter these Internet activities. 33 Of course, there is a risk that
the neutral may assert a violation of its territorial integrity by the aggrieved belligerent and resort to self-defense measures. 34 In these situations, an aggrieved
belligerent's prior notice to the neutral may be prudent, unless the neutral is seen
to be cooperating ,vith the offending belligerent.
Ifbelligerents may not build radio stations on neutral territory, by analogy
they cannot use Internet "stations" in neutral territory, and a neutral must shut
these down. 35 Ifa neutral does not have the means, or the willingness to do so, an
aggrieved belligerent may take proportional action. 36 It would seem, however,
that if neutrals need not control their own stations, or acts of their nationals actingin a private capacity,37 then there is no obligation to do the same for Internet
information thus passed to a belligerent under the Hague law. Query whether
the pattern of neutrals' controlling radio stations in two W orId Wars38 gives credence to establishing a customary norm obliging neutrals to do so in future
conflicts.
The land warfare rules for railway rolling stock offer an interesting parallel.
Hague V provides that belligerents may not requisition railway rolling stock of
companies chartered by a neutral State except if absolutely necessary.39 However, if a private company chartered by a neutral consents to the stock's use for
warlike purposes, the stock acquires enemy character and may be seized and appropriated as though it is enemy State property.40 If a belligerent may not use
neutral-owned rolling stock unless absolutely necessary but may seize stock a
belligerent uses for carrying war goods, could it not be argued by analogy that a
belligerent may not "seize" neutrals' Internet transmissions except in emergency, but that if the neutral allows the Internet to be used for messages harmful
to the belligerent, those aspects of the Internet are fair game?
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Humanitarian law allows a neutral to authorize passage of wounded and sick
from belligerent forces ifvehicles transporting them carry no combatants or war
materials. If a neutral allows passage, the neutral assumes responsibility for providing for control and safety of these personnel. 41 If a neutral has discretion to
authorize passage for belligerents' sick and wounded armed forces personnel
while assuming responsibility for their control and safety, it would seem that the
neutral may, but is not required to, allow Internet messages regarding belligerent
sick and wounded, if the neutral can be sure that no information affecting the
war is passed home. 42 Similarly, a prisoner of war staying in neutral territory43
may not be allowed Internet access to send information home that amounts to
belligerent activity, any more than the prisoner ofwar should be allowed to mail,
telephone, televise, etc., such information.

Neutrality at Sea, Naval Warfare, and Information Warfare
The same Charter principles applicable to land warfare apply to war at sea, including any IW component. 44 Oceans users, whether neutral or belligerent,
must pay due regard45 to other oceans users' rights and freedoms besides the rules
ofnaval warfare, which apply in armed conflict situations through the LOS conventions' other rules clauses. 46 Treaty suspension or termination principles also
may apply. Although many treaties may bear on IW issues, during armed conflict they may be impossible to perform,47 fundamental change of circumstances
may intervene,48 or there may be a material breach. 49Jus cogens norms, e.g., perhaps the inherent right ofself-defense, 50 may trump treaty law. 51 War, or armed
conflict, may end or suspend treaty obligations. 52 General principles ofnecessity
and proportionality in attack govern as in land warfare. 53
Hague XIII, governing maritime neutrality, imposes virtually the same rules
as Hague V, governing land warfare, in forbidding belligerent use of neutral
ports and waters for erecting wireless telegraphy stations or any apparatus for
communicating \vith belligerent forces. Belligerents cannot use neutral ports or
waters as a base of operations. 54 The same considerations and applications of
these principles in land warfare to IW issues should apply in maritime warfare situations. 55 Moreover, because these principles appear in two major multilateral
treaties and the regional Maritime Neutrality Convention, their common principles are strengthened. 56
There is an important difference between neutrals' duties with respect to
movement ofbelligerent troops across neutral land territory and movement of
belligerent naval forces into neutral ports and waters. The duty to repel troop
movements is absolute, while the duty to detect and oust belligerent naval
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forces is subject to the neutral's having the means to do so.57 A neutral is only
"entided," not required, to intern a belligerent warship when that warship
should have departed neutral waters. 58 When the Hague Conventions were
signed in 1907, there were many countries that may not have had naval forces
or detection capability sufficient to oust a belligerent naval force or to intern it.
There must have been a presumption that any State could use its military or
other forces, perhaps police, to repel a belligerent troop movement, but that
might not be the case for naval incursions. The same is true today. For IW
neutrality principles, it could be argued that the duty of a neutral to act to prevent belligerent IW warfare from within its territory is not absolute, but conditional on the ability of the neutral to detect IW activity and to be able to act to
counter this activity. Not every country has computer and related systems as
sophisticated as, e.g., the United States, and these countries should not be held
to an absolute duty. Such being the case, computer-sophisticated nations like
the United States must be held to the same duty, i.e., use of means at the disposal of the United States, which might be quite considerable.
Principles governing destruction of undersea cables strengthen a view that
belligerents can operate to seize or destroy Internet connections in enemy territory and in areas subject to no State's sovereignty, e.g., the high seas, if a belligerent controls that area, e.g., for blockade. Belligerents can seize or destroy
cables connecting enemy territory with neutral territory, but only a terminus
in enemy territory. These cables may be seized or destroyed only "in cases of
absolute necessity," i.e., general principles of necessity and proportionality59
must be observed. No distinction is made between publicly and privately
owned cables. 6o Neutrals' control of radio broadcasting within their territorial
waters during two World Wars 61 is another example of proper control of electronic emissions by neutrals within their territories. If neutrals had this obligation for radio, the "Internet" of the day, is it not also true for today's World
Wide Web of communications?
Issues related to contraband, visit and search or diversion, and the possibility
ofdestruction ofneutral merchant ships that have acquired enemy character62 or
ships or aircraft that are believed to be aiding the enemy although othenvise exempt63 might seem to have litde to do with IW. However, certain general principles might be derived and used in the IW context.
Given Internet technology's exponential growth, it would seem extraordinarily useless to go through a lengthy treaty negotiation process to draft an agreement listing prohibited Internet behaviors or actions that would be as out ofdate
as the computers that began to produce the treaty at the start of the drafting and
negotiation process. This has been the experience of trying to define

238

George K. Walker
contraband. The lesson from contraband law is that in a fast-developing or
ever-changing scenario, trying to go beyond general principles is rarely wise, except in the obvious, "hospital ship" or poison gas situation, where everyone
agrees on the rules, at least for hospital ships if they are not used to further an enemy war effort, and for poison gas as long as there is no use. 64
If we analogize dealing \vith Internet messages to neutral merchantmen on
the high seas, could an electronic "visit and search," followed by appropriate
proportional and necessary action, perhaps electronic diversion, be devised for
belligerents to use with neutrals?65
If an Internet message or "hack" contributes to enemy war-fighting or
war-sustaining efforts, assists an enemy's armed forces intelligence system, or
acts as an auxiliary military or naval channel of communication or information,
is not the attack and destruction option available, subject to necessity and proportionality principles?66 To be sure, perhaps special principles analogous to the
passenger and crew safety rule when a merchantman must be destroyed,67 might
be devised. For example, if messages relating to safety of civilians are involved,
can they be electronically isolated and allowed through?
Might an electronic "firewall" analogous to blockade principles in the law of
naval warfare 68 be devised to let appropriat<:; messages get through? The Internet
might be used for traditional blockades and other interdictions, besides the usual
Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs) and Notices to Mariners (NOTMARs) published, e.g., by radio.
Is it useful to think in terms ofspecific exemptions for neutral Internet usage?
Hague XI lists enemy vessels exempt from capture and possible destruction because of their nature, among them a debatable exemption for mails as distinguished from mail ships. 69 Would it be helpful to develop exempted computer
systems, kinds of messages, or Internet systems exempt from "capture" and possible destruction unless used to aid an enemy? What about generally exempt
ships, e.g., hospital ships unless they aid an enemy, that send Internet-based messages that might be construed by a belligerent to be encrypted messages? Would
this raise a suspicion, however unfounded, such that use ofInternet-based messages by neutral exempt vessels should be banned or somehow restricted? Can
system segregation be done with today's technology? Is it too early for this?
Could the Internet itselfbe used to advise of these exemptions, if a case by case
basis seems appropriate?
Might military commanders consider declaring control ofimmediate areas of
military operations on the Internet, analogous to the immediate area ofnaval operations?70 To be sure, this kind ofdeclaration may invite more trouble than it is
worth, i.e., it could tell adversaries where to go. The Internet can, df course, be
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used to send these notices, besides NOTAMs and NOTMARs sent by more traditional means for addressees who lack Internet capability, or to assure transmission and receipt, i.e., where there is a possibility that an Internet-based message
did not go through.
Although it is not part of the law of neutrality, any country can declare temporary use of the high seas for naval maneuvers, including air operations.71
These maneuvers can be conducted during armed conflict. Is there a correlative right of declaring temporary use of part of the Internet for "IW maneuvers"? Might notice of these IW maneuvers be posted on the Internet besides
more traditional means, e.g., NOTAMs or NOTMARs? (As in the case of
warning of immediate area of naval operations during war, such a notice,
whether by NOTAM or NOTMAR through traditional media or the Internet, invites attention.)
Could or should an "Internet exclusion zone" be declared,72 warning neutrals ofhigher risk ifthey "surf' in the area or otherwise use the "zone"? Like notices for immediate areas of naval operations, these warnings could be posted on
the Internet, as well as by more traditional means, e.g., NOTAMs and
NOTMARs. (Notice of blockade, immediate area of naval operations, or exclusion zones, must be effective;73 while the Internet might be a valuable communication medium, it cannot replace more traditional and widely available
methods until it has become as universal as more traditional means; this may be a
problem for vessels flagged in countries that are not as advanced in Internet technology as, e.g., the United States.)
Could States declare temporary "defense zones" for parts of the Internet
spectrum, analogous,to a high seas defense zone or cordon sanitaire that may be
announced for an area of naval and air operations, to warn other countries of a
risk of self-defense responses? This is not a feature of naval warfare but an incident of self-defense. 74 And because the technology is still emerging, and any
treaty now might be premature,75 down the road when and if the problem settles down, could agreements modeled on the INC SEA agreements76 be considered to minimize confrontation? Longstanding treaties promoting safety at
sea offer another model.7 7
Might states proclaim an "Internet Identification Zone" (lIZ) for parts of the
Internet spectrum, analogous to an ADIZ?78 The lIZ would be a warning, perhaps published on the Internet and in other sources to assure notice, ofa possibility of interception if Internet users approach too close to a neutral State's vital
interests (analogous to its territory, the anchor for an AD IZ), including, e.g., defense and central economic communications systems. The ADIZ is not an air
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warfare feature; it serves as an identification method. An IIZ might have a similar
function.
I do not have technical competence to respond to these questions, or perhaps
to ask others, but might they be asked? Some inquiries may be far-fetched or impractical, but given the exponential growth of technology, some of which may
be shrouded for national security reasons, I ask them.
The Internet is like a merchant shipping system or the US public highway system. There is no regulation of the Internet akin to systems regulating radio and
television broadcasting. It is up to the individual or government as to the nature
ofvehicles used (the computers) and, beyond a small access charge paid Internet
access providers, the user is largely on its own as to how the Internet is employed
as to content and destination. Therefore, although there may be belligerent and
neutral rights, perhaps by analogy to those for naval warfare as I have posited
them, there are relatively few positive duties, apart from a requirement to respect belligerents' and neutrals' rights, however those may be stated.
As a final point, the due regard principle, derived from the LOS and its law of
naval warfare counterpart,79 might be part of the analysis; i.e., belligerents must
have due regard for rights ofInternet users that are neutral, even as Internet users
must have due regard for others on the Net in the absence ofarmed conflict. And
even as belligerents must have due regard for the maritime environment in today's wars at sea, might they be required to have due regard for the general
Internet environment?

Neutrality, Aerial Warfare, and Information Warfare
As in the cases ofland and sea warfare, Charter principles may apply in given
situations. 80 Treaty suspension or termination principles may apply.81 Besides
air warfare rules, belligerents must observe principles of military objective, necessity, and proportionality applying to all modes of war. 82
Like neutrality rules for land and sea warfare, air warfare rules require respect
for neutral airspace; belligerent military aircraft cannot enter it. 83 When coupled
\vith identical treaty-based neutrality rules applicable to land and sea warfare,
this principle is strengthened. 84 The Hague Air Rules principle, the same as
those for land warfare but differing from the weaker requirements for neutrals
for naval warfare, is that actions taken by a neutral to enforce neutral rights, cannot be construed as a hostile act. 85 Since two branches of the law of neutrality
protect the neutral in its actions to enforce neutrality, particularly since Internet
activity necessarily ultimately involves the land in terms of sending and reception of messages, and the flight of Internet messages through lines might be
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analogized to aircraft flight, should not the rule be that actions taken by a neutral
should not be deemed a hostile act, and not an unfriendly one, as the law ofnaval
warfare has it? A neutral might enforce its rights by an unfriendly act, i.e., a
retorsion,86 a lesser action in that it does not involve proportional reprisals, i.e.,
an unlawful act designed to compel compliance. 87
There is an important difference between neutrals' duties with respect to
movement of belligerent troops across neutral land territory and movement of
belligerent naval forces into neutral ports and waters, or movement ofbelligerent military aircraft into neutral airspace. The duty to repel troop movements is
absolute, while the duty to detect and oust belligerent naval or air forces is subject to a neutral having the means to do so.88 When the Hague Conventions
were signed, many countries may not have had naval forces or detection capability sufficient to oust a belligerent naval force. The same assumption may underlie
the 1923 Hague Air Rules regarding intruding belligerent military aircraft and
their internment. There must have been a presumption that any State could use
its military or other forces, perhaps police, to repel belligerent troop movements, but that might not be the case for every country for naval or military aircraft incursions. The same is true today. For IW neutrality rules, it could be
argued that a neutral's duty to act to prevent belligerent IW from '\vithin its territory is not absolute, but conditional on the neutral's ability to detect IW activity
and to act to counter it. Not every nation has computer and related systems as sophisticated as, e.g., the United States, and these countries should not be held to
an absolute duty. Such being the case, computer-sophisticated nations like the
United States must be held to the same duty, i.e., use of means at the disposal of
the .United States, which might be quite considerable.
A neutral's duty to prescribe a route away from belligerents' military operations for aircraft ordered by a belligerent89 might be seen, by analogous precedent for IW, to say a neutral must prescribe Internet "routes" not to interfere
with military operations. The qualifying phrase in the Hague Air Rules, that a
neutral must exact guarantees, indicates a possible weakness of the prescription,
however. For IW, if a neutral prescribes a "route," can the neutral enforce the
prescription, given the Internet's decentralized nature? The Hague Air Rules
principle that a neutral must, commensurate with the means at its disposal, prevent aerial observation of belligerent operations,90 is in the same vein. Should
neutrality law for IW say that a neutral must, commensurate with the means at its
disposal, prevent IW observation, through reading Internet traffic, ofbelligerent
military operations?
The Hague Air Rules, like naval warfare rules, allow a belligerent's force
commander to prohibit neutral aircraft from passing in an immediate vicinity of
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a commander's forces or to make aircraft follow a particular route, if the commander considers the aircraft is likely to prejudice success of military operations.
If an aircraft, once notified, refuses to comply, a belligerent may fire on it.91 In
the IW context, might a belligerent assert a similar right to prohibit Internet activity in an immediate electronic or physical vicinity of military operations, or
direct that Internet traffic follow routes? Can the belligerent "shoot down" noncomplying Internet traffic, using proportional means, coming close to military
Internet operations, after notice? Might notice of these areas of operations be
posted on the Internet besides more traditional means? (A correlative problem is
that any radio or Internet message invites attention to the location of belligerent
forces.)
Although it is not part of the law of neutrality, any country can declare temporary use of the high seas for naval maneuvers, including air operations. 92
These maneuvers can be conducted during armed conflict. Is there a correlative
right of declaring temporary use of part of the Internet for "IW maneuvers"?
Might notice of these "maneuvers" be posted on the Internet? (As in the case of
the warning ofthe immediate area ofnaval operations during war, such a notice,
whether by NOTAM or NOTMAR through traditional media or the Internet,
invites attention.)
Exclusion zones for neutral aircraft as well as ships, reasonable in scope and
duration and which are properly noticed, are a valid method ofwarfare at sea today. They are not free-fire zones but are designed to warn neutral aircraft of
heightened danger if they enter a zone. 93 Might an "IW exclusion zone" with
similar qualifications be declared to warn Internet users of a heightened risk of
being "fired on" if they venture into certain "areas" of the Internet? Might notice of these zones by NOTAMs and NOTMARs be posted on the Internet besides more traditional means?
Could States declare temporary "defense zones" for certain parts of the
Internet spectrum, analogous to a high seas defense zone or cordon sanitaire that
may be announced for an area of air operations, to warn other countries of a risk
of self-defense responses? This is not a feature of air warfare but an incident of
self-defense. Here too INCSEA and safety of life at sea treaties could be models
for advance agreements for these situations. 94
Might States proclaim an "Internet Identification Zone" (lIZ) for certain
parts of the Internet spectrum, analogous to the ADIZ?95 The lIZ would be a
warning, perhaps published on the Internet and in other sources to assure notice,
of a possibility of interception if Internet users approach too close to a neutral
State's vital interests (analogous to its territory, the anchor for an ADIZ) , including, e.g., its defense and central economic communications systems. The ADIZ
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is not a feature ofair warfare; it serves as an identification method. The lIZ might
have a similar function.

Neutrality and Information Warfare in Space
There is little new "hard law" in norms applicable to conflict in outer
space,96 other than applying Charter law,97 the law of suspension or termination of treaties,98 and general principles of necessity and proportionality, and
perhaps due regard in some cases, applying to armed conflict anywhere. 99
There is no special neutrality law like that applying to land, sea, or air warfare.
Any law of neutrality applicable to IW in space must be derived by analogy
from these other sources, as was the case before agreements like the Outer
Space Treaty, the Liability Convention, the Registration Convention, etc.,
were negotiated. lOO And it is this general methodology that may be the most
useful. Iflaw for outer space could be derived by analogy from other systems
before formal treaties appeared, cannot the same be said for IW? Which legal
system(s) should supply the model(s)?

Conclusions: Appraisal of Neutrality in the Charter Era
in the Context of Information Warfare
As the manned space flight era became a reality, commentators recommended applying other, well-established law to space age situations by analogy.
UN Charter law applies to situations in space, as it does for interactions on land,
at sea, and in the air. Today treaties, and practice pursuant to them, govern many
other aspects of space interactions, but not all of them. These agreements are
subject to Charter law primacy and to law of treaties rules for suspension or termination. Beyond the treaties, some space law issues remain unresolved, and applying other systems oflaw by analogy seems to be the norm.
Internet warfare issues involving neutrals, and the law to be applied to them,
seem close to the situation for warfare in space. Charter-based norms, e.g., prohibition against violating States' territorial integrity or political independence,
the right of self-defense and the primacy of Security Council decisions, must be
applied. There are telecommunications treaties to which Charter norms and law
of treaties rules for suspension and termination are subject. Some LOAC principles, e.g., those related to telegraphy, will apply to Internet messages as well as
more conventional communications, although these are also subject to Charter
norms, e.g., self-defense. Beyond these relatively well-established norms, there
are many principles, primarily in the law of naval warfare but also some from the
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law ofland and air warfare, that may be cited by analogy in IW situations involving neutrals.
Undeniably neutrality as a general concept has as much vitality today as in the
pre-Charter era. The claim, that there is a customary right to assert an intermediate status of nonbelligerency between traditional neutrality and belligerency,
may have been strengthened since 1945, although most States and commentators do not recognize it. The precedents in some cases are almost identical with
those in the last two centuries. Even if nonbelligerency cannot be asserted as a
customary norm, the overlay ofprinciples ofself-defense, retorsion, reprisals not
involving use of force, and state of necessity apply to support actions at variance
,vith a practice of strict neutrality in the traditional sense. 10l
Because of options under the Charter for non-binding resolutions by the Security Council and perforce the General Assembly, the potential for exceptions
even with a binding Council decision and the opportunity for claims of neutrality-perhaps modified by a new non-belligerency concept in the Charter
era-remains large. "Far from being moribund, these traditional rights [of neutrality and self-defense] apply logically in conditions oflimited wars"-the type
of conflicts that have beset the planet since 1945-even more rigorously than in
conditions of total war. 102
The advent of information war may call for modifYingJessup's remarks published in 1936 when the world was recovering from a world war and preparing
for the next one. 103 Transoceanic communication was dependent on undersea
cables for urgent messages, although radio signals could also reach across the seas.
The most advanced countries had cross-border telephone and telegraph access
by landlines. Most transoceanic communications went by ship, although the first
international air mail deliveries were beginning for transoceanic and transcontinental communications. However, the usual means of communication then for
most messages was what we call "snail mail" today. The Internet was a Cold War
creation. 104 Today, Jessup might say that although the basic neutrality rules remain in place and they apply for IW, their application for IW must be by
analogy.
One option is a non-law analysis l05 although that alternative is less than fashionable today, given a tendency to find some law (perhaps publicist's views if
there is no customary law, treaty, or general principle available).106 Commentators correctly assert that it is almost universally accepted that a considerable body
oflaw applies to States' use of force in cyberspace contexts. 107 If that is true, a
correlative is that the considerable body of traditional neutrality law, some of it
restated in treaties oflongstanding duration that are now almost universally recognized as declaring custom, and the rest in customary norms or general
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principles, also exists. Ifwe choose to operate in the context oflaw, under a rule
oflaw, the law of neutrality developed for more traditional warfare modalities
offers useful analysis by analogy where there are no positive standards, e.g., rules
governing cables.
Today one exception to the traditional law is Charter law, e.g., the inherent
right to individual and collective self-defense, which predates the Charter.
Others include prohibitions against violating a State's territorial integrity, and
the primacy of UN Security Council decisions. lOS Another might be human
rights, although human rights treaties' derogation clauses reflect traditional
rules of suspension or termination during international armed conflict. 109 The
policies of peacetime telecommunications treaties, although perhaps limited in
application during armed conflict because of their terms or because of general
rules of treaty suspensions or termination, are another. 110 Analysis ofIW issues
in a context of the law of neutrality as it applies to land, sea, and air warfare reveals common denominators and differences. For example, belligerents have a
duty not to cross neutral's land territory by land or air, or to use neutral land or
seas (i.e., the territorial sea) for a base of operations. lll A neutral's duty to repel
these incursions varies with the modality of incursion. If it is by land, there is
apparendy an absolute duty, at least to try. If the incursion is by belligerent air
or naval forces, the neutrals' duty is relative. It must use the means at its disposal to counter an incursion, including means at its disposal to intern an intruding aircraft and those aboard. A neutral may elect to detain a belligerent
warship that has remained in port when it is not entided to stay there. Undoubtedly the 1907 Hague drafters, and the 1923 Commission ofJurists that
prepared the Hague Air Rules, believed every country had some semblance of
ground forces to repel a belligerent's troop movements across neutral lands, but
that not every State had the means of detecting or repelling incursions by air or
sea, or of interning belligerent military vessels or aircraft. ll2 The "means at a
neutral's disposal" principle should be the test for a neutral's duty for
belligerents' IW incursions; the neutral should be held to apply the means at its
disposal to detect and repel these incursions. Such being the case, the correlative right of a belligerent aggrieved by IW incursions should be that the belligerent may take such actions as are necessary in the territory of a neutral that is
unable (or perhaps unwilling) to counter enemy IW force activities, making
unlawful use of that territory, a principle from the law of naval warfare. ll3
Beyond these general rules applying to neutrality in a context of all warfare
modes, the rules begin to diverge among the different kinds of armed conflict,
the closest kinship being seen between the law of naval warfare and aerial warfare, particularly naval warfare. From a geographic perspective, these mediums
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for combat offer more persuasive reasons for analogy to IW. Both are concerned
with "fluid" mediums, like the Internet's electronic pathways.114 The law ofnaval warfare is concerned with warfare on the high seas, a part of the globe that is
no nation's property. It also is concerned with ocean areas over which coastal
States may exercise sovereignty, i.e., the territorial sea; or jurisdiction, i.e., the
exclusive economic zone (EEZ). There is also a relatively well-developed set of
rules or general principles in the LOS and the law of naval warfare upon which
analogies for IW may be drawn. lIS Closer examination of the LOS and the law
of naval warfare in connection with and its interfaces with Charter law, the LOS
and treaty termination or suspension principles may produce analogies suitable
for developing IW principles.
The LOAC is replete with notice requirements. 116 The new technology
might be employed to give notice, adequate under the circumstances, in traditional warfare situations in addition to the usual means of doing so. Given IW
technology's fluidity and e:l>.l'onential growth, the relative lack (thus far) ofpractice in IW situations, and the relatively minimal number (again thus far) ofclaims
and counterclaims117 in the worldwide electronic arena, any international
agreement(s) on IW would likely be obsolete in terms of hardware and practice
before their ink would be dry.llS Haphazard as the prospect may be, rules for IW
should be left to developing customary norms and general principles, perhaps
with help from commentators,119 before serious consideration ofa treaty begins.
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whether anticipatory self-defense, i.e., a response with force that is necessary, proportional and
admitting of no other alternative, is permitted in the UN Charter era. Compare, c.g., Nicaragua
Case, supra note 20, at 14, 347 (Schwebel, J., dissenting); STANlMAR A. ALE.,'{ANDROV,
SELF-DEFENSE AGAINST THE USE OF FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 296 (1996); BOWETT,
supra note 5, at 187-93; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, § 127; KELSEN, COLLECTIVE SECURITY,
supra note 5, at 27; MCCORMACK, supra note 20, at 122-24, 238-39, 253-84, 302; MCDOUGAL
& FELICIANO, supra note 5, at 232-41; SCHACHTER, supra note 18, at 152-55; SHARP, supra note
4, at 33-48 (real debate is the scope of the anticipatory self-defense right; responses must be
proportional); STONE, supra note 20, at 3; THOMAS & THOMAS, supra note 20, at 127; Bunn, supra
note 20, at 69-70; Greenwood, Remarks, in Panel, supra note 20, at 158, 160-61; Linnan, supra
note 20, at 57, 65-84, 122; Lowe, supra note 14, at 127-30; McHugh, supra note 20, at 61;
Mullerson & Scheffer, supra note 20, at 93, 109-14; Murphy, supra note 20, at 241; Reisman, supra
note 20, at 25, 45; Robertson, supra note 20, at 89, 101; Turner, supra note 20, at 43, 62-80;
Waldock, supra note 20, at 451, 496-99 (anticipatory self-defense permissible, as long as principles
of necessity, proportionality observed) with, e.g., BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 257-61,275-78,
366-67; DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 182-87, 190; HENKIN, supra note 20, at 121-22;JESSUP, supra
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note 20, at 166-67; O'CONNELL, supra note 20, at 83,171; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, 52aa, at
156; RIFAAT, supra note 20, at 126; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 675-76; Farer, supra note 20, at 30,
36-37; Kolosov, supra note 20, at 232, 234; Kunz, supra note 20, at 872,878; Lagoni, supra note 20,
at 161,162; Tucker, TIle Illterpretation if War Under Present IlItemationalLAw, supra note 20, at 11,
29-30; see also Tucker, Reprisals and Self-DefellSe, supra note 20, at 586 (States may respond only
after being attacked). The fonner USSR generally subscribed to the restrictive view. Kolosov,
supra note 20, at 234; Mullerson & Scheffer, supra note 20, at 107. US policy is that States may
respond in anticipatory self-defense, subject to necessity and proportionality principles, and
admitting of no other alternative. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5,';~ 4.3.2-4.3.2.1.
Nicaragua Case, supra note 20, at 103, declined to address the issue.
32. UN Charter, arts. 51, 103; see also supra notes 20, 31. A neutral member of a collective
self-defense alliance, permitted by UN Charter, art. 51, may assist an alliance member that is a
target of aggression by joining the self-defense response. If that occurs, whatever neutrality the
assisting State might have claimed is lost, and it becomes a cobelligerent against the aggressor. On
the other hand, it is possible for the neutral member to declare neutrality and confine its responses
to retorsions and nonforce reprisals. Ifso, this may be a violation of the alliance treaty, but that is a
matter between the neutral and the target ofaggression. Ifa belligerent attacks enemy forces taking
refuge on neutral territory, or these forces are there for other purposes, 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note
5, § 320, at 685, says this is not hostilities against a neutral, "but are mere violations of neutrality;
and they must be repulsed, or reparation must be made for them, ... ," citing id. § 362. Besides a
violation of neutrality law, it is submitted that an attacking belligerent, unless attacking under a
theory of necessity, has committed a violation of UN Charter, art. 2(4), rendering it susceptible to
self-defense or other responses by the invaded neutral; if. 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 20, § 326.
33. In naval warfare, for example, if a neutral cannot or will not enforce its duty to require
belligerent forces to cease and desist from the conduct ofhostilities while in that neutral's waters, an
aggrieved belligerent may act against those belligerent forces present in neutral waters. Helsinki
Principle 2.1, supra note 13, at 501; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 7.3; 2
O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 1118-19 (Dresdell, Altmark incidents); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5,
§§ 325-25a (same).
34. UN Charter, arts:51, 103; see also supra notes 20, 31, 32 and accompanying text.
35. Under Hague V, Art. 3, and Hague XIII, Art. 5, the latter applying to naval warfare,
belligerents may not "(a) Erect on the territory of a neutral Power a wireless telegraphy station or
other apparatus for ... communicating \vith belligerent forces on land or sea; [or] (b) Use any
installation of this kind established by them before the war on the territory of a neutral Power for
purely military purposes, and which has not been opened for the service of public messages."
Hague V, supra note 30; Hague XIII, supra note 30. Under Hague V, Arts. 8-9, "A neutral Power is
not called upon to forbid or restrict the use on behalf of belligerents of telegraph or telephone
cables or of\vireless telegraphy apparatus belonging to it or to companies ofprivate individuals....
Every measure ofrestriction or prohibition ... must be impartially applied ... to both belligerents.
A neutral Power must see to the same obligation being observed by companies or ... individuals
owning telegraph or telephone cables or \vireless telegraphy apparatus." The 1923 Hague Radio
Rules echo these principles, adding that belligerent mobile radio stations must abstain from using
their apparatus. Commission ofJurists to Consider & Report Upon Revision ofRules ofWarfare,
Rules for the Control of Radio in Time of War, Feb. 19, 1923, arts. 2-4 (Hague Radio Rules),
rcpri/lted ill LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 14, at 367,368.
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying teJ.1:.
37. A neutral cannot, however, allow belligerents to establish intelligence offices on its
territory. 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 356, at 748-51; see also 11 WHITEMAN, supra note 5, at
220.
38. See supra note 35.
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39. Hague V, supra note 30, art. 19,36 Stat. at 2326; compare Convention with Respect to
Laws & Customs ofWar on Land, July 29, 1899, Regulations, art. 54, 32 id. 1803, 1823; see also 2
LEVIE, supra note 30, at 832.
40.2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 355, at 747.
41. Hague V, supra note 30, arts. 13-14,36 Stat. at 2324-25; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT,
supra note 5, ~ 7.3.1.
42. This is by analogy from the rule that vehicles transporting sick and wounded carry no
combatants or war materials and rules for belligerent radio stations on neutral territory. See sf/pra
notes 35-36 and 39-41 and accompanying text.
43. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
44. See UN Charter, art. 103. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10,
1982, art. 221, 1833 U.N.T.S. 3, 489 (LOS Convention); Convention Relating to Intervention
on the High Seas in Cases ofOil Pollution Casualties, Nov. 29, 1969, art. 1(1), 26 U.S.T. 765, 767,
970 U.N.T.S. 211, 212 (Intervention Convention); see also 4 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
ONTHELAWOFTHESEA:ACOMMENTARY~~221.1-221.9(h) (MyronH. Nordquistetal. eds.,
1991); 2 O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 1006-8. The 1958 Law of the Sea Conventions and the
LOS Convention "other rules" clauses, repeated in the navigational articles, have almost
universally been said to mean the LOS is subject to the LOAC in appropriate situations. Compare,
e.g., LOS Convention preamble (matters not regulated by Convention to be governed by rules,
principles ofinternationallaw), arts. 2(3) (territorial sea), 19(1), 21 (1),31 (innocent passage), 34(2)
(straits transit passage), 58(1), 58(3) (EEZs), 78(2) (continental shelf; coastal State cannot infringe or
interfere \vith "navigation and other rights and freedoms of other States as provided in this
Convention"), 87(1) (high seas), 138 (the Area), 303(4) (archaeological, historical objects found at
sea; "other international agreements and rules of international law regarding the protection of
objects ofan archaeological and historical nature"), 1833 U.N. T.S. at 398, 400, 404-05, 408, 410,
419, 431-32, 446, 517, with, e.g., Convention on the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, preamble, art. 2, 13
U.S.T. 2312, 2314, 450 U.N.T.S. 11,82 (High Seas Convention), (treaty restates customary law);
Convention on the Territorial Sea & Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1(2), 14(4), 17,22(2),
15 id. 1606, 1608, 1610, 1611, 1612,516 U.N.T.S. 205, 206-08, 214, 216, 220 (Territorial Sea
Convention). Although the other 1958 law of the sea conventions do not have other rules clauses,
they say they do not affect the status of waters above that are part of the high seas, for the
continental shelf; or other high seas rights, for high seas fisheries. Convention on the Continental
Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, arts. 1, 3, id. 471, 473, 499 U.N.T.S. 311, 312, 314 (Continental Shelf
Convention); Convention on Fishing & Conservation ofLiving Resources ofthe High Seas, Apr.
29,1958, arts. 1-8, 13, 17 id. 138,140-43,559 U.N.T.S. 285, 286-92, 296 (Fishery Convention);
Territorial Sea Convention, supra, art. 24(1), 15 id. at 1612, 516 U.N.T.S. at 220 (contiguous
zone). Thus the High Seas Convention regime, including its Article 2 other rules provision, is
incorporated by reference into these Conventions, which modifY some High Seas Convention
principles but not the Article 2 other rules clause. The LOS Convention, supra, art. 33, 1833
U.N.T.S. at 409, governing the contiguous zone, refers to an ocean belt contiguous to the
territorial sea, which is part ofthe high seas except declared EEZ, fishing or continental shelf areas,
othenvise subject to the high seas regime. See also JESSUP, supra note 2;JESSUP & DEAK, supra note
3; W. ALISON PHILLIPS & ARTHUR H. REEDE, NEUTRALITY: THE NAPOLEONIC PERIOD
(1936); EDGAR TURLINGTON, NEUTRALITY: ITS HISTORY, ECONOMICS AND LAW (1936).
45. The LOS conventions also promote a due regard principle for shared ocean uses; one user
must observe due regard for other users' rights, e.g., a right to lay cables that might carry Internet
messages. Compare LOS Convention, supra note 44, arts. 87, 112-15, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 433, 440
with High Seas Convention, supra note 44, arts. 2, 26-29, 13 U.S.T. at 2314, 2319-20, 450
U.N.T.S. at 82,96-98; Convention for Protection ofSubmarine Cables, Mar. 14, 1884,24 Stat.
989; Declaration Respecting Interpretation of Articles II & IV, Dec. 1, 1886, 25 id. 1424; see also
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COlOMBOS, slIpra note 5, §§ 399-400; 3 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF
THE SEA 1982: A COMMENTARY ~ 87.9(k) (Myron H. Nordquist et al. eas., 1995);
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, slIpra note 5, ~ 2.4.3; 2 O'CONNEll, slIpra note 5, at 796-99,
819-24; 1 OPPENHEIM, slIpra note 17, §§ 285, at 789; 310-11; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra
note 18, § 521(3); Bernard H. Oxman, TI,e Regime if Warships Under the Ullited Nations Conventioll
Oil the Law ifthe Sea, 24 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 837-88 (1984); Horace
B. Robertson, Jr., TI,e "New" unu if the Sea alld the Law if Anned COliflict at Sea, 273-74, in
READINGS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM THE NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REVIEW
1978-1994 (John N. Moore & Robert F. Turner eds., 1994) (Vol. 68, US Naval War College
International Law Studies). Due regard clauses apply to other sea areas. See, e.g., LOS Convention,
slIpra note 44, arts. 27(4) (territorial sea), 39(3) (a) (straits transit passage), 56(2), 58(3), 60(3) (EEZ),
79(5) (cables, pipelines), 142(1), 148 (the Area), 234 (ice-covered areas), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 407-08,
411-12,418-20,430,448,450,493; Continental ShelfConvention, slIpra note 44, arts. 1,3-5(1),
15 U.S.T. at 473, 499 U.N.T.S. at 312, 314 ("reasonable measures for e};ploration ... [and]
el,. ploitation" of continental shelf balanced against right to lay, maintain submarine cables,
pipelines; continental shelf exploration, e.'''ploitation must not result in "unjustifiable interference
with" navigation, high seas fishing, oceanographic research); Territorial Sea Convention, slIpra
note 44, art. 19(4), 15 U.S.T. at 1611, 516 U.N.T.S. at 216-18 (due regard for navigation
interests); see also REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra note 18, §§ 511(b)-511(d), 514-15. LOS
Convention, slIpra note 44, art. 311(1), 1833 U.N.T.S. at 519, declares it supersedes the
Continental Shelf, High Seas and Territorial Sea Conventions, slIpra note 44, among parties to the
LOS Convention. Recent commentaries advocate a due regard standard for belligerents during
war; e.g., they must pay due regard to neutrals' high seas, continental shelf and EEZ rights and
duties besides observing other LOAC rules. Helsinki Principles 3.1,4 & cmts., slIpra note 13, at
503,505; San Remo Manual, slIpra note 12, ~~ 34-36; Robertson, slIpra at 303. Helsinki Principle
1.4, cmt., slIpra note 13 at 500-01, recites a due regard standard in a context of requiring
proportional attacks under the LOAC where neutral territory, waters or airspace might be
involved.
46. See slIpra note 44 and accompanying text.
47. A country creating the state of impossibility ofperformance cannot invoke the principle.
Vienna Convention, sllpra note 20, art. 61, 1155 U.N.T.S., at 346; BROWNLIE, sllpra note 17, at
623; T.O. ELIAS, THE MODERN LAW OF TREATIES 177-87 (1974); REsTATEMENT (THIRD),
slIpra note 18, §§ 102-03, 128-30; Helsinki Principle 1.3 & cmt., slIpra note 13, at 499;
International Law Commission, Report on the Work of Its Eighteenth Session, Report if the
Commissioll to the Gelleral Assembly, UN Doc. Al6309/Rev. 1, reprinted ill 2 (1974) YEARBOOK OF
THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 225-26 (lLC Report); 1 OPPENHEIM, slIpra note 17,
§ 650; REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra note 18, § 336 cmt. c & r.n.3; George K. Walker, Illtegration
and Disintegratioll ill Ellrope: Reorderillg the Treaty Map ifthe COlltillellt, 6 TRANSNATIONAL LAW 1,
65-66 (1993); bllt see LORD MCNAIR, THE LAW OF TREATIES 685 (2d ed. 1961) (no separate
impossibility doctrine).
48. Fundamental change of circumstances may not be invoked to suspend or terminate
humanitarian law treaty obligations, particularly their reprisal provisions, or by a party causing the
problem. Vienna Convention, slIpra note 20, art. 62, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 347; see also
Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung. v. Slovakia), 1997 I.CJ. 7, 39 (art. 62 a customary norm);
Pisheriesjllrisdictioll (U.K. v. Ice.), 1973 I.CJ. 3,18 (same); BROWNLIE, slIpra note 17, at 623-26;
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 657,662-63 (1935); Helsinki Principle 1.3 & cmt., sllpra
note 13, at 499; McNAIR, slIpra note 47, at 685-91; 1 OPPENHEIM, slIpra note 17, § 651;
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra note 18, §§ 336, 339; IAN SINCLAIR, THE VIENNA
CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 20 (2d ed. 1984); David Bederman~ T71e 1871 London
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Declaration, Rebus Sic Stantibus and a Primitivist View ofthe Law ofNations, 82 AMERICANJOURNAL
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1 (1988); Gyorgy Harsatzti, Treaties and the Fundamental Change of
Circumstances, 146 RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE De DROIT INTERNATIONAL 1,21
(1975); Walker, supra note 47, at 66-68; compare ARIE E. DAVID, THE STRATEGY OF TREATY
TERMINATION ch. 1 (1975); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Circumstances, 61
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 895 (1967) (criticizing Vienna Convention
approach) with ELIAS, supra note 47, at 119-28 (traditional rebus sic stantibus approach no longer
admissible today).
49. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, art. 60, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 346; see aL~o
Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 48, at 39 (Article 60 a customary norm); Namibia, 1971
I.CJ. 4, 47; BROWNLIE, supra note 17, at 622-23; ILC Report, supra note 47, at 253-255;
MCNAIR, supra note 47, ch. 36; 1 OPPENHEIM, supra note 17, § 649; SINCLAIR, supra note 48, at
20, 166, 188-90.
50. Kahghan, supra note 20, at 767,827. Belligerents can respond by non-force reprisals or
retorsions. TUCKER, supra note 5, at 199 n.5. Reprisal has been characterized as a kind ofself-help
or sanction. Most commentators say reprisals involving force against a State not engaged in armed
conflict with the acting State are not lawful in the Charter era. However, other coercion that is
unlawful, e.g., deliberate breach ofa trade treaty to compel a State engaging in unlawful conduct to
comply with international norms, is admissible. Anticipatory reprisal using force is forbidden. A
State considering reprisal must first call upon an offending State to mend its ways. Compare
Declaration on Principles ofInternational Law Concerning Friendly Relations & Co-Operation
Among States in Accordance with the Charter ofthe United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, ~~ 1,3, UN
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, U.N. Doc. Al8028 (1970), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1294,
1297 (1970); Gabdkovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 48, at 54; Nicaragua Case, sllpra note 20, at 14,
127; Air Service Agreement of27 March 1946 (U.S. v. Fr.), 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443; BOWETT, supra
note 5, at 13;J.B. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 401-02 (HumphreyWaldock ed., 6th ed.
1963); BROWNLIE, supra note 5, at 281; GOODRICH ET AL., supra note 9, at 340-47; ROSALYN
HIGGINS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH THE POLITICAL
ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 217 (1963); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~
6.2.3.1; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 43, 52a, at 152-53; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 105; STONE,
supra note 5, at 286-87; Roberto Ago, Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc.
AlCNAI318 & Add. 104, (1979), 2(1) YEARBOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
COMMISSION 13, 39, 42 (1981); Roberto Barsotti, Amled Reprisals, in ANTHONY CASSESSE,
THE CURRENT LEGAL REGULATION OF THE USE OF FORCE 79 (1986); D.W. Bowett,
Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AMERiCANJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 20
(1972); Rosalyn Higgins, The Attitude of Western States Toward Legal Aspects of the Use of Force, in
CASSESSE, supra, at 435, 444; Tucker, Reprisals and Self-Defense, supra note 20, at 586-87; with
DINSTEIN, supra note 5, at 215-16 (reprisals using force admissible in Charter era); LAWRENCE T.
GREENBERG ET AL., INFORMATION WARFARE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 26-27 (1998).
Retorsion, or retortion, is a target State's lawful but unfriendly response to another State's
unfriendly practice or act whether illegal or not, to coerce the latter to discontinue that practice or
act. Retorsionary responses must be proportional. BRIERLY, supra, at 399; WILLIAM EDWARD
HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § 120 (A. Pearce Higgins ed., 8th ed. 1924); 2
HYDE, supra note 5, § 588; FRITS KALSHOVEN, BELLIGERENT REPRISALS 27 (1971); 7
MOORE, DIGEST § 1090; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 135; RESTATEMENT (THIRD), supra
note 18, § 905 & r.n.8; SIMMA, supra note 9, at 104; STONE, supra note 5, at 288-89; Waldock,
supra note 20, at 451,458.
51. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, arts. 53, 64, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 344,347.
52. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, does not provide for the operation of war, or armed
conflict, on international agreements. However, other authorities agree that war may suspend or
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tenninate treaties, depending on the nature of the treaty and the circumstances ofthe conflict. See,
e.g., ILC Report, supra note 47, at 267; Institut de Droit International, The Effects ojAnned Conflict
011 Treaties, Aug. 28, 1985, arts. 2, 3, 5, 11, 61(2) Annuaire 278, 280-82 (1986); RegulatiollS
Regardillg the Effect oj War 011 Treaties, 1912, arts. 1, 4,7-10, reprillted ill 7 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-55 (1913); Clark v. Allell, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947); Kamuth v. Ullited
States, 79 U.S. 231, 240-42 (1929); Techtv. Hughes, 128N.E.185, 191 (N.Y.), cert. dellied, 254 U.S.
643 (1920); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 99(4)-99(5); George B. Davis, The Effects ojWar UpOIl
[lltemational COllventiollS and Private COlltracts, 1927 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN SOCIETY
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 124-29; G.G. Fitzmaurice, TheJudidal Clauses ojthe Peace Treaties, 73
RECUEIL DES COURS DE L'ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 255,307-17 (1948);
Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 28, 29 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW SUPPLEMENT 657, 662-64 (1935); CecilJ.B. Hurst, The Effect oj War 011
Treaties, 2 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 37,40 (1921); James J. Lenoir, The

Effect oj War Oil Bilateral Treaties, with Spedal Riference to Redprocal [llheritallce Treaty ProvisiollS, 34
GEOREGETOWN LAW JOURNAL 129, 173-77 (1946); Walker, supra note 47, at 68-71.
Impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances claims may overlap war suspension or
tennination claims. Impossibility, fundamental change, etc., are the only bases for tennination or
suspension for treaty relations between belligerents and neutrals. Herbert W. Briggs, The Attorney
General Invokes Rebus Sic Stantibus, 36 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 89
(1942); Oliver J. Lissitzyn, Treaties and Changed Cirall/lstances, 61 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 911 (1967); Walker, sllpra note 47, at 68-69.
53. See SIIpra note 33 and accompanying te:l.."t.
54. See supra note 30 and accompanying te:l.."t.
55. See sllpra notes 30-33 and accompanying text.
56. Hague V, Hague XIII, Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30; Vienna
Convention, supra note 20, preamble, art. 38, 1155 U.N.T.S. at 333,341; BROWNLIE, sllpra note
17,at5; 1 OPPENHEIM,supranote 17, §§ 10, at 28, 11, at 32-36; RESTATEMENT (THIRD),sllpra
note 18, § 102(3) & cmt. £
57. Hague V, supra note 30, art. 5, 36 Stat. at 2323; Hague XIII, supra note 30, art. 25, id. at
2432; Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30, arts. 4(a), 26, 47 id. at 1991, 1994, 135
L.N. T .S. at 196, 208; General Declaration, sllpra note 30, 3(c), at 605; Hague Air Rules, supra note
30, arts. 42, 47, at 214-15; AFP 110-31, supra note 30, ~ 2-6c (air operations principle; Hague Air
Rules, supra, not cited); 3 HYDE, supra note 5, §§ 855, 856A, 888; 2 LEVIE, supra note 30, at 788;
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 7.3; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 316, 323, 325;
TUCKER, supra note 5, at 260-61; bllt see Helsinki Principle 2.2, sllpra note 13, at 502 (neutral
"must" take measures to enforce warship transit, sojourn rules).
58. This includes interning crew. If an enemy prize is brought to a neutral port under distress
or similar conditions and does not leave when directed, its crew must be interned. Hague XIII,
supra note 30, arts. 21, 22, 24, 36 Stat. at 2431-32; see also Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra
note 30, art. 17,47 Stat. at 1993,135 L.N.T.S. at 204; Nordic Neutrality Rules, sllpranote 30, art.
4(1), 188 L.N.T.S. at 299, 305, 311, 319, 325. Hague XIII, supra note 30, art. 23 provides for an
exception to this rule, entry of prizes under other than distress conditions, but several nations,
including the United States, reserved to art. 23. See 36 Stat. at 2432,2438. Hague XIII, arts. 21-22
are customary law; art. 23 is not because of US and UK reservations, now applying to more States
through treaty succession principles. The S.S. Appal/l, 243 U.S. 124, 150-51 (1917); 3 HYDE, supra
note 5, §§ 862, 864; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 328a; 333, at 706; 345; Symposium, State
Successioll ill the Fonner Soviet Unioll and ill Eastern Europe, 33 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 253 (1993); Walker, supra note 47. Neutrals must allow belligerent
warship entry for asylum, distress or other purposes if they comply ,vith innocent passage rules.
LOS Convention, supra note 44, arts. 18-19, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404 (innocent passage in distress,
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but subject to other rules ofinternational law, i.e., LOAC); Territorial Sea Convention, supra note
44, arts. 1(2), 14, 15 U.S.T. 1608, 1610,516 U.N.T.S. 206, 214; Helsinki Principle 2.2, supra note
13, at 502; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 3.2.2.1; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§
343-46; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 21.
59. Convention Respecting Laws & Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Regulations,
Art. 54, 36 Stat. 2227, 2308. This is limited to land warfare when a belligerent occupies enemy
territory and seizes or destroys landing ends of cables connecting that territory with a neutral State.
COLOMBOS, supra note 5, § 569.
60. COLOMBOS, supra note 5, § 576; United States Department of the Navy, Law of Naval
Warfare: NWIP 10-2 ~ 520b (1955 through Change 6,1974) (NWIP 10-2); compare Institute of
International Law, The Laws ofNaval War Governing the Relations Between Belligerents, art. 54
(1913), reprinted in SCHINDLER & TOMAN, supra note 30, at 857,867 (Oxford Naval Manual).
Modern manuals do not analyze the issue thoroughly, probably because ofdisuse ofcables. See SAN
REMo MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 37. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 1.6, at 24
discusses cables in an LOS conte:Kt; see also supra note 45 and accompanying tel>."t.
61. See supra note 38 and accompanying teA"t.
62. Neutral merchant ships acquire enemy character and may be treated as enemy merchant
vessels if they operate direcdy under enemy control, orders, charter, employment or direction.
ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 7.5.2; SAN REMo MANUAL, supra note 12, mJ112-17.
See also Helsinki Principle 5.1.2(4), supra note 13, at 507; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~
8.2.2.2; SAN REMo MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 67.
63. E.g., hospital ships, medical aircraft; see generally Helsinki Principles 5.1.2(5)-5.1.2(6),
supra note 13, at 507; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 8.2.3; SAN REMO MANUAL,
supra note 12, ~~ 47-52, 136-40, 146, 151-52, citing treaties, custom (hospital ships; small coastal
rescue craft; vessels granted safe conduct; vessels carrying cultural property; liners carrying only
passengers; ships on religious, non-military scientific or philanthropic missions; small coastal
fishing boats, coastal traders; vessels that have surrendered; life rafts, life boats). Neutral aircraft
carrying passengers, or serving as medical or cartel aircraft, are also protected. See ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 8.2.3; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, '\1'\1140-45, 153-58.
64. Cj Horace B. Robertson, Jr., Modern Technology and the Law of Amled COliflict at Sea, in
Robertson, supra note 5, 362, 370; New Technologies and Anlled COliflicts at Sea, 14 SYRACUSE
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 678, 704 (1988). This may mean that
trying to define IW methods or means that are per se unlawful will fail, particularly when
technology is developing eAl'Onentially.
65. For a discussion of high seas visit and search, see generally Helsinki Principles 5.2.1, 5.2.7,
supra note 13, at 509,511; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, '\1~ 7.6-7.6.2; SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 12, '\1~ 116, 118-24.
66. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
67. E.g., requirements for placing passengers and crew in safety before destroying an enemy
merchantman. Proces-Verbal Relating to Rules ofSubmarine Warfare Set Forth in Part IV of the
Treaty ofLondon of22Apri11930, Nov. 6,1936,3 298,173 L.N.T.S. 353; Treaty for Limitation
& Reduction of Naval Armaments, Apr. 22, 1930, art. 22(2), 46 Stat. 2858, 2881, 112 L.N.T.S.
65, 88. See also ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra Bevans note 5, ~~ 8.2.2.2, 8.3, 8.4; SAN REMO
MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 151.
68. Neutral merchantmen must observe blockades that are duly established and notified and
are effective and impartial. Helsinki Principles 5.2.10, 5.3, sllpra note 13, at 513; ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, '\1~ 7.7.1-7.7.5; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~'Il93-104.
69. Hague Convention (XI) Relative to Certain Restrictions with Regard to Exercise of the
Right of Capture in Naval War, Oct. 18, 1907, arts. 1-2,36 Stat. 2396, 2408 (Hague XI). See also
supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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70. Helsinki Principle 3.3, cmt., supra note 13, at 505; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 5, 'Ii~ 7.8-7.8.1; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~ 108 & cmt. 108.1. Helsinki Principle
3.2, supra at 504, declares:
Neutral ships should be aware of the risk and peril of operating in areas where active naval
hostilities take place. Belligerents engaged in naval hostilities must, however, take
reasonable precautions including appropriate warnings, if circumstances permit, to avoid
damage to neutral ships.
This does not authorize converting a naval operations area into a free-fire zone and does not
obliterate the customary rule that belligerents must warn away neutral shipping from operational
areas. The Helsinki rule might come into play ifthere is a chance encounter ofbelligerent forces.
71. MYRES S. MCDOUGAL & WILLIAM T. BURKE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
753-{)3 (1962); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 2.4.3.1; REsTATEMENT (THIRD),
supra note 18, § 521, cmt. b;John H. Pender,Jurisdictiollal Approaches to Maritime Ellvirollmellts: A
Space Age Perspective, 15 JAG JOURNAL 155-58 (1960); US Delegation Paper, UN Conference on
the Law of the Sea, Legality ofUsillg the High Seas ill COllllectiollwith Nuclear WeapollS Tests ill the
Padfic Oceall, Doc. No. US/CLS/Pos/48 (2)-(3), Annex II (Feb. 20, 1958), reprillted ill 4
MARJORIE M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 546,549 (1968).
72. Helsinki Principle 3.3 & cmt., supra note 13, at 504; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra
note 5, ~7.9; SANREMO MANUAL, supra note 12, 'Ii~ 105-08; WALKER, supra note 1,403-10;
Vaughan Lowe, TIle Impad of the LAw of the Sea Oil Naval Warfare, 14 SYRACUSE JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND COMMERCE 657,673 (1988); W J. Fenrick, The Exclusioll Zolle ill
the LAw of Naval Warfare, 1986 CANADIAN YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 91, 124-25
(1986). Helsinki Principle 3.2, supra note 13, at 504, might come into play if there is a chance
encounter ofbelligerent forces and has no effect on exclusion zone declarations. See also supra note
70.
73. See supra notes 68, 70, and 72 and accompanying text.
74. Nyon Arrangement, Sept. 14, 1937, 'Ii~ 1-4, 181 L.N.T.S. 135, 137-38, amended by
Agreement Supplementary to NyonArrangement, Sept. 17, 1937, 'Ii~ 1-3, id. 149, 151 appears to
be the first instance of announced high seas defense zones. The belligerents declared them in the
1982 Falklands/Malvinas War; the United States announced them in the 1980-88 Tanker War.
See O'CONNELL, supra note 20, at 80,168,172 (1979); WALKER, supra note 1, 398-400; L.F.E.
Goldie, Commelltary, ill LAW OF NAVAL WARFARE, supra note 14, at 489, 493-95; Goldie,
l\laritime War Zolles alld Exclusioll Zolles, ill Robertson, supra note 5, at 156, 192; O'Connell,
Intematiotlal LAw alld COli temporary Naval OperatiollS, 44 BRITISH YEARBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 54-56 (1970).
75. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
76. E.g., Agreement on Prevention ofIncidents on & Over the High Seas, May 27,1972,
USSR-US, 23 U.S.T. 1168, 852 U.N.T.S. 151 (INCSEA); Protocol, May 22,1973,24 id. 1063;
see also Agreement on Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities, June 12, 1989, USSR-US,
T.I.A.S. No. 1485, reprillted ill 28 I.L.M. 879 (1989). Other countries had INCSEA treaties with
the fonner USSR. Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, ~ 2.8 n.ll0. These may be subject to
treaty succession principles. Symposium, supra note 58; Walker, supra note 47.
77. E.g., Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, Oct. 20,
1972,28 U.S.T. 3459; International Convention for Safety ofLife at Sea, Nov. 1, 1974,32 id. 47,
in force for most States ,vith many amendments. See gellerally United States Department of State,
Treaties in Force 406-09 (1998) (TIF).
78. The legal basis for an ADIZ is a nation's right to establish reasonable conditions for entry
into its territory. AFP 110-31, supra note 30, ~ 2-1g; MYRES MCDOUGAL ET AL., LAW AND
PUBLIC ORDER IN SPACE 307-09 (1963); ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 2.5.2.3;

259

Neutrality and Information Warfare
REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, § 521, r.n.2; NWIP 10-2, supra note 60, 11 422b; Note,
Air Dgfllse Identification Zolles: Creeping Jurisdiction in the Airspace, 18 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 485 (1978). US ADIZs are published in 14 C.F.R. part 99 (1999). Cj.
Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7, 1944, arts. 3, 8, 11,61
Stat. 1181-83, 15 U.N.T.S. 298, 300, 304, requiring non-military aircraft to submit to rules for
entering another State's territory unless there has been a prior agreement.
79. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
80. UN Charter, art. 103; see also supra note 15 and accompanying tel\."!:.
81. Vienna Convention, supra note 20, does not provide for the operation of war, or armed
conflict, on international agreements. However, other authorities agree that war may suspend or
terminate treaties, depending on the nature of the treaty and the circumstances of the conflict. See,
e.g., ILC Report, supra note 49, at 267; Institut de Droit International, 17Je Effects ~An/led COI!t1iCt
on Treaties, Aug. 28,1985, arts. 2, 3, 5,11, 61(2} Annuaire 278, 280-82 (1986); id., Regulations
Regarding the Effect ~Waron Treaties, 1912, arts. 1,4,7-10, reprinted ill 7 AMERICANJOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 153-55 (1913); Clark v. Allell, 331 U.S. 503, 513 (1947); Kamuth v. United
States, 79 U.S. 231, 240-42 (1929); Techt v. Hughes, 128 N.E. 185, 191 (N.Y.), cert. det/ied, 254
U.S. 643 (1920); 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, §§ 99(4)-99(5); Davis, supra note 52, at 124-29;
Fitzmaurice, supra note 52, at 255,307-17; Harvard Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties,
supra note 52, art. 35(b), at 662-64; Hurst, supra note 52, at 37,40; Lenoir, supra note 52, at 129,
173-77; Walker, supra note 47, at 68-71. Impossibility or fundamental change of circumstances
claims may overlap war suspension or termination claims. Impossibility, fundamental change, etc.
are the only bases for termination or suspension for treaty relations between belligerents and
neutrals. Briggs, supra note 52, at 89; Lissitzyn, supra note 52, at 911; Walker, supra note 47, at
68-69.
82. Helsinki Principles 1.4, 3.1, 4, supra note 13, at 500, 503, 505; ANNOTATED
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~1l8.1-8.1.3; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, ~1l34-42, 44, 46;
see also supra note 45 and accompanying text.
83. LOS Convention, supra note 44, arts. 18-19, 1833 U.N.T.S. at 404; Territorial Sea
Convention, supra note 58, art. 14, 15 U.S.T. at 1610,516 U.N.T.S. at 214; Convention on
International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention), Dec. 7,1944, arts. 1,3,61 Stat. 1180, 1181,
15 U.N.T.S. 295, 298; ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, 11 2.3.2.1, at 2-9; 1
O'CONNELL, supra note 5, at 118. Maritime Neutrality Convention, supra note 30, art. 14,47 Stat.
at 1993; General Declaration, supra note 30, ~~ 3(a), 3(f), at 605; Hague Air Rules, supra note 30,
art. 40, at 214; AFP 110-31, supra note 30, 1l2-6c; Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note 30, art. 8,
188 L.N.T.S. at 301,309,315,321,329 (air ambulances excepted); ANNOTATED SUPPLEl'.1ENT,
supra note 5, 117.3.7; 2 OPPENHEIM, supra note 5, § 341a; SANREMO MANUAL, supra note 12,11
18. During World War II neutrals prohibited belligerent military aircraft entry. 11 WHITEMAN,
supra note 5, at 357-58.
84. I.CJ. Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD), supra note 18, §§ 102-D3.
85. Compare Hague Air Rules, supra note 30, art. 48, at 215, with Hague V, supra note 30, art.
10, 36 Stat. at 2324 and Hague XIII, supra note 30, art. 26, id. at 2433 ("unfriendly act"}.
86. See supra note 50 and accompanying tel\."!:.
87. Today, most commentators say a State cannot invoke a reprisal involving use offorce,
except when a State is a belligerent and "vishes to respond, after request for the offender to comply
with the law, with a proportional reprisal against an enemy. See supra note 50 and accompanying
text.
88. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
89. Ifa belligerent orders an aircraft from a company or person in neutral territory, the neutral
must prescribe a route for the aircraft away from the neighborhood of military operations of the
belligerent's opponent and "must exact whatever guarantees may be required to ensure that the
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aircraft follows the route prescribed." General Declaration, supra note 30, ~ 3(t), at 605; Hague Air
Rules, supra note 30, art. 46, at 214.
90. Hague Air Rules, supra note 30, art. 47, at 215; see also Nordic Neutrality Rules, supra note
30, art. 13, 188 L.N.T.S. at 303, 309, 315, 323, 329; Harvard Draft Convention on Rights &
Duties of Neutral States in Naval and Aerial War, art. 6, 33 AMERICAN JOURNAL OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 175, 245 (Supp. 1939) (Harvard Draft Neutrality Convention); 2 LEVIE,
supra note 30, at 827.
91. Compare Hague Air Rules, supra note 30, art. 30, at 212 witTz AFP 110-31, supra note 30, ~
2-6b (aircraft entering area of immediate air operations subject to "damages" from hostilities;
belligerents cannot deny neutral aircraft access to international airspace even ifbound for enemy
territory); Annotated Supplement, supra note 5, f1~ 7.8-7.8.1; San Remo Manual, supra note 12, ~
108 & cmt. 108.1; see also supra note 70 and accompanying text. Helsinki Principle 3.2, supra at 504,
might come into play if there is a chance encounter of belligerent forces.
92. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 2.4.3.1; see also supra note 71 and
accompanying text.
93. ANNOTATED SUPPLEMENT, supra note 5, ~ 7.9; SAN REMO MANUAL, supra note 12, f1~
105-08; see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
94. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
96. See supra notes 83, 89 and accompanying text.
97. UN Charter, art. 103; see also supra notes 9, 15,25 and accompanying text.
98. See supra note 81 and accompanying teA"!:.
99. See supra notes 45,82 and accompanying text.
100. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14, 1975,28 id.
695, 1023 U.N.T.S. 15 (Registration Convention); Convention on International Liability for
Damages Caused by Space Objects, Mar. 29, 1972, 24 id. 2389, 961 U.N.T.S. 187 (Liability
Convention); Liability Convention; Treaty on Principles Governing Activities in Exploration &
Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon & Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,1967, art. 6-8, 18
U.S.T. 2410, 2415-16, 610 U.N.T.S. 209 (Outer Space Treaty); Agreement on Rescue of
Astronauts, Return of Astronauts, & Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22,
1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, 672 U.N.T.S. 119 (Rescue & Return Agreement).
101. See supra notes 2-53 and accompanying teA"!:.
102.2 O'CONNELL, supra 1I0te 5, at 1142. Some limited, or localized, wars may have been total
war from the belligerents' perspectives, but on a world scale basis, they might be considered local or
limited in nature. One recent example is the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq conflict, the maritime aspects of
which are examined in WALKER, supra 1I0te 1, ch. 2.
103. JESSUP, supra note 2 at 156 ("There is nothing new about revising neutrality; it has
undergone an almost constant process of revision in detail.") See also supra notes 2-5 and
accompanying text.
104. SeegellerallyACLU v. Rello, 929 F. Supp 824, 830-38 (B.D.Pa. 1996)., qffd, 521 U.S. 844,
849-53 (1997); G. BURGESS ALISON, THE LAWYER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNET (1995);
PHILIP BACZEWSKl BT AL, THE INTERNET UNLEASHED (1994); KATIE HAFNER &
MATTHEW LYON, WHERE WIZARDS STAY UP LATE: THE ORIGINS OF THE INTERNET
(1996); GeorgeJohnson, From Two Small Nodes, a MigTzty Web Has Growl!, NEW YORK TIMES,
Oct. 12, 1999, atDl; for historical analyses of the development of computers and the Internet. As
\Vorld War II ended, Vannevar Bush suggested the basic idea ofa personal computer; he traced the
history of calculators, discussed speech-controlled typewriters, and advocated document storage
on super fine grain microfilm shuffied by mechanical fingers. Bush believed that new logic and new
symbolism would be necessary. Although he missed the idea of electronic communication, much
of what Bush wrote in this perspective, futuristic article has become reality, albeit in different
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modalities. Vannevar Bush, As We May Think, 176 ATLANTIC MONTHLY 101 O'uly 1945);
Johnson, slIpra. Mechanical computers were used aboard warships before W orId War II to supply
fire control solutions to naval guns through electrical circuits. Although most firing corrections on
these computers were made aboard ship by telephone communications among gunners and fire
control personnel who operated visual or radar-assisted gun directors and ship's combat
information centers (i.e., a room aboard ship where radar repeaters portrayed shell splashes), shore
bombardment effects and recommendations for corrections sometimes came by radio
communications between ships and shore spotters, e.g., Army or Marine Corps forward artillery
observers on the ground or in aircraft. The ship's computer "stored" prior information that had
been inserted and retained this information until it was changed by operators. Information might
be relayed through internal ship communications, perhaps to other computers aboard ship, but
there was no data transfer among e}"1:ernal computers, i.e., those on other vessels. Antisubmarine
warfare systems, shipboard torpedo attack systems, and submarine fire control systems for torpedo
attack employed similar fire control solutions, using electronics-based systems (e.g., sonar, radar)
and mechanical devices operated in similar fashion, but there was little, if any, information
exchange between an attacking ship and other stations. These systems operate in similar fashion
today, although electronics-based computers have replaced mechanical systems, and missiles have
replaced gun projectiles in many cases.
1 05. "When the legal community first considered the .... regime that governed state activities
and military operations in Cyber Space, some U.S. government attorneys stated rather boldly that
(applying) modem information systems technology to military purposes was so new that I/O law
applied." SHARP, slIpra note 5, at 5. A policy behind this approach is national sovereignty. See UN
Charter, art 2(1); S.S. LotllS (Fr. V. Turk), 1927 PC. IJ., Ser. A, No. 10, at 4,18.
106. Cj I.CJ. Statute, Art 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD) slIpra note 18, at 102-03.
107. E.g. Office of General Counsel, Department of Defense, An Assessment ofInternational
Legal Issues in Information Operations (Nov. 1999). The paper is appended to this volume as the
Appendix. See also GREENBERG, slIpra note 50, at 17; SHARP, slIpra note 5, at 5.
108. UN Charter, arts. 2(4), 25, 48, 51, 103; see alsosllpra notes 2-44 and accompanying test.
109. See, e.g., International Convention on Civil & Political Right, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 4,
19(3)(b) (derogation clauses), 17 (forbidding interference ,vith correspondence), 19 (freedom of
expression), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 174, 177, 178; European Convention for Protection of Human
Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4,1950, arts. 6(1), 8(2), 10(2) (derogation clauses), 8(1)
(correspondence), 10 (right of free expression regardless of frontiers), 213 id. 221, 228, 230;
American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22,1969, art. 13(2) (b) , 27 (derogation clauses), 13
(freedom of e}""pression regardless of frontiers), 14 (right of reply), 9 I.L.M. 673, 679-80, 683
(1970). Banjul (African) Charter on Human & Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, art. 9 (rights to
receive information, disseminate opinions ,vithin the law), 21 id. 58, 60 (1982) has no derogation
clause; it would be subject, however, to the usual law of treaties principles on impossibility of
performance, etc. See also SUBATRA ROy CHOWDHURY, RULE OF LAW IN A STATE OF
EMERGENCY 12-13, 22-29, 59, 121-25,210-11 (1989) (analyzing International Law Association
Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency (1984»; MYRES S.
MCDOUGAL ET AL., HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 813-15 (1980); Joan
Fitzpatrick, Protection agai/lSt Abllse of the "COI/cept of Emergel/CY," in HUMAN RIGHTS: AN
AGENDA FOR THE NEXT CENTURY 203 (AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
STUDIES IN TRANSNATIONAL POLICY., LOUIS HENKIN &JOHN LAWRENCE HARGROVE EDS.
1994); HENKIN, Intematiol/al Hllman Rights as "Rights" 1 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW 446-47 (1979);
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, arts. 12, 19,27 U.N.G.A. Res. 217
(1948), reprinted in DIETRICH RAUSCHNING ET AL., KEy RESOLUTIONS OF THE UNITED
NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1946-1996, at 321-22 (1997). Nllclear Weapol/s, 1996 I. CJ. 226,
at 239-40, observed that "the protection of the (Civil & Political Rights Covenant) does not cease
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in times ofwar, except by operation ofArticle 4 of the Covenant whereby certain provisions may
be derogated from in a time of national emergency. Respect for the right to life is not such a
provision. . . .[T]he right not arbitrarily to be deprived of one's life applies also during
hostilities.... [W]hat is an arbitrary deprivation of life ... then £ills to be determined by the
applicable lex spedalis . .. the [LOAC] ... designed to regulate the conduct of hostilities. Thus
whether a particular loss oflife, through use of a certain weapon in warfare, is to be considered an
arbitrary deprivation oflife contrary to ... the Covenant, can only be decided by ... the [LOAC]
and not .... from the terms of the Covenant." To the extent that human rights treaty norms
represent custom, law of treaties analysis does not apply. However, derogations from custom like
the persistent objector rule do, and will apply to Declaration norms having status as custom. "The
United States has long denied that any obligation rests upon it when a neutral to attempt to control
e.. .:pressions of opinion by private persons within its territory and adverse to the cause of any
belligerent," although the US Government has appealed to its citizenry to refrain from partisanship
during war. 3 HYDE, slIpra note 5, § 874.
110. These might be applied through the analogy of the due regard principle, taken from the
LOS and applied during armed conflict by analogy. See sllpra note 79 and accompanying te},:t.
111. See sllpra note 30 and accompanying text.
112. See sllpra notes 57, 58 and accompanying text.
113. See slIpra note 33 and accompanying te>..1:.
114. Outer space also has this characteristic, but beyond the Charter and general principles
applicable to any situation, there is little law from which analogies for neutrality law in the IW
context might be drawn. See sllpra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
115. See slIpra notes 44-79 and accompanying text.
116. See, e.g., slIpra notes 68, 70-72, 78, 89, 91-93 and accompanying text.
117. Myres S. McDougal, TIle Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International Law of the Sea, 49
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 356-58 (1955).
118. See slIpra note 64 and accompanying text. The law for dropping projectiles from balloons
comes to mind. See Declaration Prohibiting Discharge of Projectiles & E>..-plosives from Balloons,
Oct. 17, 1907, 36 Stat. 2439, still in force for 28 countries including the United States, and perhaps
more if treaty succession principles are taken into account. See TIP, slIpra note 15, at 450;
Symposium, sllpra note 58; Walker, slIpra note 47.
119. LCJ. Statute, art. 38(1); REsTATEMENT (THIRD), slIpra note 20 §§ 102-03; see alsosllpra
notes 18-19 and accompanying text.

263

